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Abstract 
Typical approaches to plan recognition start from 
a representation of an agent's possible plans, 
and reason evidentially from observations of the 
agent's actions to assess the plausibility of the 
various candidates. A more expansive view of 
the task (consistent with some prior work) ac­
counts for the context in which the plan was gen­
erated, the mental state and planning process of 
the agent, and consequences of the agent's ac­
tions in the world. We present a general Bayesian 
framework encompassing this view, and focus on 
how context can be exploited in plan recogni­
tion. We demonstrate the approach on a prob­
lem in traffic monitoring, where the objective is 
to induce the plan of the driver from observation 
of vehicle movements. Starting from a model of 
how the driver generates plans, we show how the 
highway context can appropriately influence the 
recognizer's interpretation of observed driver be­
havior. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The problem of plan recognition is to induce the plan of ac­
tion driving an agent's behavior, based on partial observa­
tion of its behavior up to the current time. Deriving the un­
derlying plan can be useful for many purposes-predicting 
the agent's future behavior, interpreting its past behavior, 
or generating actions designed to influence the plan itself. 
Researchers in AI have studied plan recognition for several 
kinds of tasks, including discourse analysis (Grosz & Sid­
ner, 1990), collaborative planning (Huber & Durfee, 1993 ), 
and adversarial planning (Azarewicz et at., 1989). These 
works have employed a great variety of reasoning tech­
niques, operating on similarly various plan representations 
and adopting varied assumptions about observability. 
The common theme underlying these diverse motivations 
and approaches is that the object to be induced is a plan, and 
that this plan is the cause of observed behavior. If there is 
anything special about the task of plan recognition as op­
posed to recognition in general, it must be due to special 
properties of plans: how they are constituted, and how they 
cause the behavior we observe and wish to predict, inter­
pret, and influence. 
In this paper, we focus on one of these special properties­
the context in which the plan is generated-and how it 
can be exploited in the recognition process. W hereas most 
previous approaches have emphasized the relationship be­
tween plans and their observable effects,1 we argue that it 
is equally necessary to consider evidence that would bear 
on which plan would have been appropriate for the agent 
to generate. We demonstrate this point through an example 
application in traffic monitoring, where the interpretation 
of an individual vehicle's action depends on the surround­
ing highway context. Our techniques for reasoning about 
plan-generation context are based on Bayesian networks, as 
part of a general Bayesian framework for plan recognition. 
This contribution can be considered a variant extension of 
the model of Charniak and Goldman ( 1993), and of the ap­
proach advocated by Huber et al. (1994). 
2 PLAN RECOGNITION 
2.1 TOWARDS A GENERAL BAYESIAN 
FRAMEWORK 
One of the aims of our work is to elucidate the fundamen­
tal elements of plan recognition, and to develop a general 
Bayesian framework for approaches to this task. Achiev­
ing generality is complicated by the diversity of represen­
tations for plans and techniques for plan generation; there­
fore, we present the framework at multiple levels of speci­
ficity. The most abstract specification is designed to accom­
modate most conceivable versions of plan recognition, and 
by introducing further distinctions we taxonornize the ap-
1 Although, as we point out in the discussion below, several of 
these approaches can also accommodate the sort of context infor­
mation we are concerned with. 
proaches. 
The framework for plan recognition is distinguished from 
uncertain reasoning in general by two special features of 
plans. First, plans are structured linguistic objects. Plan 
languages considered in AI research range from simple se­
quences of action tokens to general-purpose programming 
languages. In either case, the recognizer can and should ex­
ploit the structure of plans in inducing them from partial ob­
servations ofthe actions comprising the plan. Another way 
to say this is that plans are descriptions of action patterns, 
and therefore any general pattern-recognition technique is 
automatically a plan recognition technique for the class of 
plans corresponding to the class of patterns associated with 
the given technique. 
The second special feature of plans is that they are ratio­
nal constructions. They are synthesized by a rational agent 
with some beliefs, preferences, and capabilities, that is, a 
mental state. Knowing the agent's mental state and its ra­
tionality properties strongly constrains the possible plans it 
will construct. (The degree of constraint depends on the 
power of the rationality theory we adopt.) The rational ori­
gin of plans is what distinguishes plan recognition from pat­
tern recognition. If the observations available include evi­
dence bearing on the beliefs, preferences, and capabilities 
of the agent, then the recognizer should combine this with 
evidence from the observed actions in reasoning about the 
entire plan. 
Our framework is Bayesian in that we start from a causal 
theory of how the agent's mental state causes its plan and 
executing its plan causes activity, and reason from observed 
effects to underlying causes. Our recognizer has uncertain 
a priori knowledge about the agent's mental state, the world 
state, and the world's dynamics, which can be summarized 
(at least in principle) by a probability distribution. It then 
makes partial observations about the world, and uses this 
evidence to induce properties of the agent and its plan. 
The remainder of this section describes our framework in 
more detail. We demonstrate the utility of the framework 
by showing how extensions to the underlying conception 
of plans and planning generate corresponding extensions to 
plan recognition. Examples from our explorations of plan 
recognition in a highway traffic domain illustrate our appli­
cation of the framework to a concrete problem. 
2.2 PLANNING MODEL 
We begin with a model of the planning agent operating in 
the world. As it begins planning, the agent has a certain 
mental state, consisting of its preferences (e.g., goals), be­
liefs (e.g., about the state of its environment), and capabil­
ities (e.g., available actions). We assume the actual plan­
ning process to be some rational procedure for generating 
the plan that will best satisfy the agent's preferences based 
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on its beliefs, subject to its capabilities. This plan then de­
termines (perhaps with some uncertainty) the actions taken 
by the agent in the world. 
Most plan-recognition work concentrates only on this last 
step, the relationship between a plan and the actions taken 
in the world. Typical approaches start from a representa­
tion of the possible plans, and prune the set of possibilities 
based on the actions observed. For example, Kautz ( 1986) 
connects plans and actions through event hierarchies, which 
place the plan at the top of a taxonomy of subplans and ac­
tions. Vilain ( 1990) presents a context-free grammar repre­
sentation of these event hierarchies as an alternative model. 
Lin and Goebel ( 1991) restrict the constraint language, per­
mitting use of a faster, specialized message-passing recog­
nition algorithm. 
Given the reduced set of possible plans that could explain 
the observations, the plan recognizer must apply some pref­
erence criterion for choosing among them. For instance, 
Kautz's approach prefers explanations that involve fewer 
plans. The algorithm of Lin and Goebel prefers plan scenar­
ios that are more general. However, given two explanations 
containing the same number of plans, at the same levels of 
generality, neither algorithm has a basis for a choice either 
way. To borrow an example from Chamiak and Goldman, 
suppose we hear that Jack packed a bag and went to the air­
port. Depending on the exact event hierarchy, neither algo­
rithm may be able to decide whether Jack is in the process 
of taking a trip or conducting a terrorist bombing. 
The average reader would probably not consider the latter 
possibility, since people are much more likely to take a trip 
than bomb an airplane. Charniak and Goldman account for 
this behavior in their recognition procedure by including 
prior probabilities on plans. This allows them to distinguish 
among equally possible, but unequally plausible explana­
tions for observed activity. The recognition model of Car­
berry (1990), based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of ev­
idential reasoning instead of Bayesian techniques, takes a 
similar approach by using threshold plausibility and differ­
ence levels of belief to distinguish among competing hy­
potheses. Similar distinctions could be supported in lin­
guistic approaches as well, perhaps based on probabilistic 
grammars (Wetherell, 1980). 
2.3 MENTAL STATE 
In a particular case, we typically have information avail­
able to us that would augment these prior probabilities. For 
instance, we may know that Jack belongs to a terrorist or­
ganization, which would make the bombing explanation 
of his actions more plausible. To account for this sort of 
knowledge, the plan-recognition framework should accom­
modate all possible information about the agent's plan se­
lection process, beginning with its mental state. We can 
break down an agent's mental state into three distinct com-
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ponents: 
Beliefs. The agent's knowledge of the state of the world 
and its dynamics. Beliefs may be incomplete, uncer­
tain, or incorrect. 
Preferences. The agent's desires about the world. These 
may be simple goals, or arbitrarily graded degrees of 
utility. 
Capabilities. The agent's self-model of its available ac­
tions. Strictly speaking, this should be knowledge of 
capabilities, but we stick to the more concise term. 
We may have knowledge about any of these components 
of mental state. Looking back at Jack's situation, if we 
know that he belongs to a terrorist organization, then we 
might infer that his training included a lot of information 
about bombs, airport security, and other matters that are not 
widely known. Similarly, we may conclude that his goals 
are vastly different from those of a typical person going to 
the airport. For example, we may expect that Jack's goals 
include gaining worldwide attention for his group. Finally, 
his terrorist background may be such that he has a repertoire 
of available actions, such as conceal-bomb, beyond that of 
the vanilla air traveler. 
Plan selection also relies on the agent's beliefs about the 
current world state. For instance, if Jack knows that there is 
an important diplomat on an outgoing flight, then he prob­
ably believes that bombing that plane will generate even 
more attention for his organization. Notice that the world 
state affects plan selection only through the agent's beliefs. 
If Jack did not know about any diplomats, then the fact that 
they are present is irrelevant to his planning. By the same 
token, if Jack believes that a diplomat is on the plane even 
if none are present, it is his erroneous belief that we must 
consider. 
2.4 PLAN EXECUTION 
Once we have accounted for the agent's plan-generation 
process, we need to consider the effects of the plan's exe­
cution. In many plan-recognition domains, the external ob­
server finds the agent's actions inaccessible. In such cases, 
the recognizer observes actions only indirectly, via their ef­
fects on the world (which themselves are typically only par­
tially observable). These restricted observations then form 
the basis of inference. 
Thus, observations of the state of the world provide two 
types of evidence about the plan. First, as mentioned in Sec­
tion 2.3, the world influences the agent's initial mental state, 
which provides the context for plan generation. Second, 
changes in the world state reflect the effects of the agent's 
actions, which result from executing its plan. 
3 THE PLAN-RECOGNITION 
NETWORK 
To perform plan recognition tasks, we generate a Bayesian 
network representing the causal planning model and use it 
to support evidential reasoning from observations to plan 
hypotheses. The structure of the Bayesian network is based 
on the framework depicted in Figure 1. That diagram can 
itself be viewed as a Bayesian network, albeit with rather 
broad random variables. To make this operational, we re­
place each component of the model with a subnetwork that 
captures intermediate structure for the particular problem. 
The limited connections among the subnetworks reflect the 
dependency structure of our generic planning model. 
To illustrate this plan-recognition framework, consider the 
example problem of a driver on the highway, trying to pre­
dict the actions of the other drivers. Since these actions 
are normally limited to a small set of maneuvers (e.g. lane 
changes, passing, exiting), recognition of a driver's maneu­
vering plan would greatly assist in the prediction of future 
actions. To this end, we have worked on a probabilistic 
model of the maneuvers of a single car. We can then use 
this model to identify the current maneuver of an observed 
car and/or predict future actions, given only partial informa­
tion. The subnetwork descriptions below first present the 
general construction techniques and then provide a specific 
instantiation for this specific traffic domain. 
3.1 CONTEXT 
The network, like the causal model, begins with the initial 
world state. We must include all possibly observable events 
that are relevant to formation-the process by which the 
agent's mental state is affected by the world. By including 
these events, the recognition procedure can take advantage 
of partial information about the agent's mental state. Note 
that even though the initial world state model may itself 
include inaccessible variables, the context subnetwork in­
cludes only those which are observable. However, we may 
wish to simplify the network by providing more compact 
intermediate results derived from inaccessible variables. 
One of the motivations for maintaining a separate initial­
state subnetwork is to distinguish between our contextual 
observations and those of the agent. Therefore, we may 
have an unobservable node representing an aspect of the 
world state accessible to the agent, and an observable node 
representing a related feature accessible to us. The depen­
dency between these nodes is essentially a sensor model. If 
we are fortunate enough to have perfect sensors, then the 
context variables become redundant, since they will simply 
echo the values of the actual variables, and can be elimi­
nated. 
In this model, the initial world state is defined as causally 
prior to all agent behavior. Therefore, the corresponding 
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Figure 1: Plan Recognition Framework 
random variables can have links only from other such vari­
ables, representing dependencies within the state. Any de­
pendency links connecting a node from the initial state to 
any node outside this subnetwork must be directed to the 
outside node. 
This treatment of context differs from the work of Huber et 
al. ( 1994), where the initial situation depends on the agent's 
mental state and not the other way around as it is here. This 
was possible given the planning model employed in that 
work, that of the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) (In­
grand et al., 1992). In the PRS model, plan selection is a 
function of current goal and situation. Because these con­
text variables have no predecessors or substructure, the di­
rection of links can be reversed without changing the rest 
of the dependency structure. However, the agent's men­
tal state considered here may be more complex, especially 
in terms of its preference structure. Even if the agent has 
only simple goals, there are potential interactions among 
the goals that could affect the planning process. Hopefully, 
by following the causal structure in creating the network 
and placing the context prior to the plan, we can represent 
these interactions without greatly complicating the depen­
dency structure. 
In the traffic domain, the driver must consider several as­
pects of the initial world state in rationally choosing a plan. 
First of all, the current position and speed of the car are im­
portant factors, and we assume that both are observable, to 
the driver as well as to us. We also assume perfect sensors, 
but an extension to incorporate sensor noise is straightfor­
ward, as described above. The random variables x posi­
tion andy position of Figure 2 represent the car's lane po­
sition and distance from the highway's start, respectively. 
The driver can be in one of three lanes or may be off the 
highway, either preparing to enter or having just exited. The 
random variable y speed, denoting the car's speed, initially 
depends on the current node, since the farther left the lane, 
the faster the car is usually traveling. 
We can also observe the presence of other cars around the 
driver of interest, who must consider them in choosing 
a maneuver. For instance, if there is a car blocking the 
driver's front, then a passing maneuver is more likely. We 
can observe any cars to the driver's immediate front, back, 
left, and right, as well as in the four diagonal directions. 
In the Bayesian network, the Boolean random variable left 
clr? represents the presence of any car to the immediate left 
of the driver. There are similar variables for the right, front, 
and back, as well as the four diagonal directions. The vari­
ables indexed tO in the first column of nodes in Figure 2 con­
stitute the context subnetwork. 
3.2 MENTAL STATE 
The subnetwork representing the agent's beliefs about the 
world state must include random variables for all aspects 
of the context that the agent can observe and that factor 
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Figure 2: Planning process subnetwork 
into its decision-making. There may be some agent be­
liefs that are independent of any real-world variable. Unless 
we can observe these (perhaps through communication with 
the agent), there is no advantage in using additional random 
variables. Instead, we can fold the uncertainty in these be­
liefs into the plan subnetwork. However, agent beliefs will 
typically depend on the some aspect of the actual state of the 
world, although we can model the agent as being arbitrar­
ily uncertain or deluded. As mentioned in Section 3.1, this 
dependency represents the imperfection and/or incomplete­
ness of sensors. If the agent's sensors were perfect, then we 
could eliminate the nodes for the agent's belief variables, as 
they would take on the same values as the context variables. 
The agent's knowledge of its capabilities is usually inde­
pendent of the world state, as are its preferences in most 
cases. Simple goals can be represented as separate Boolean 
variables, though it may be useful to combine a set of mu­
tually exclusive variables into a single variable with several 
possible values. More complex preference structures will 
require more complex subnetwork structures. The agent's 
capabilities can be represented in a similar fashion. 
The model of agent formation is greatly simplified in our 
traffic domain. Because of our assumption of perfect sen­
sors, the driver's beliefs about the world correspond to the 
actual values in our simplified model. In addition, the 
agent's beliefs about its capabilities are not represented ex­
plicitly in our traffic network. Instead, the driver is as­
sumed to know all of the possible plans (as described in 
Section 3.3.1). The planning process also assumes that the 
driver has complete knowledge of how the plans can best 
satisfy its preferences in the current context. Thus the plan 
selection mechanism implicitly represents the driver's be-
liefs about its capabilities. 
We model the driver preferences with two goals. First, a 
driver has the explicit goal of getting from one exit to an­
other, though the intended exits are unknown to an exter­
nal observer. The random variable exit position in Figure 2 
represents the driver's desired exit. All of the possible exit 
positions are farther along the highway than the values of y 
position. If this were not the case, then the current position 
would provide evidence that the desired exit is probably not 
one that has been passed. Therefore, there would be a de­
pendency, but to simplify the network, we make the sets of 
y and exit positions disjoint. 
Second, there may be some constraint on the travel time 
between these exits, or the driver might have some target 
speed which is preferred for the duration of travel. How­
ever, we can usually translate the former into a desired 
speed because of the fixed positions of the exits. Therefore, 
our model uses only the random variable target y speed in 
Figure 2, with its values clustered around the speed limit. If 
the car has been on the highway for enough time, then its 
current speed should provide some clue as to the driver's 
target speed. We could model this with a link from y speed. 
On the other hand, if we have been observing the car and 
its maneuvers for some time, then these past observations 
should provide more conclusive evidence as to its target 
speed. Thus, we can make the target speed independent of 
current speed and encode our past observations in the prior 
probabilities. 
This network also contains the intermediate belief random 
variables, at exit? and at target?, in the second column 
of nodes in Figure 2. These reflect the driver's belief about 
the proximity of the desired exit and the desirability of the 
current speed, respectively. The at exit? variable depends 
only on the current position and the preferred exit, and is 
true only when the former is immediately before the latter. 
The at target? variable depends only on the current and 
preferred speeds, and its value indicates whether the current 
speed is too slow, too fast, or just right, with respect to the 
driver's desired cruising speed. 
3.3 PLANNING PROCESS 
3.3.1 Plan Variables 
The plan subnetwork is comprised of random variables col­
lectively representing the current plan. For instance, in 
Kautz's event hierarchies, there is a taxonomy of plans and 
actions. The children of a certain plan correspond to pos­
sible subplans or actions, while other links indicate neces­
sary components. If our planning model is based on such 
event hierarchies, we may designate one Boolean variable 
corresponding to each element in the taxonomy, indicating 
the presence of the corresponding plan. Or we may com­
bine certain mutually exclusive subplans into a single ran-
dom variable, which takes on a different value depending 
on the actual subplan present. 
Such hierarchies are based on the subsumption relation, re­
quiring a dependency link from the more general node to the 
more specific. The conditional probability table can repre­
sent the distribution of the specific values, given the gen­
eral. In particular, because of the subsumption relation, we 
can set the conditional probability of a child node given that 
its parent node is false to zero. 
In the traffic domain, we can classify driving maneuvers ac­
cording to the lane changes involved. The simplest plan is 
to simply continue driving in the same lane. At the next 
level of complexity, a driver can shift one lane to the left 
or right. We consider entering and exiting the highway as 
specific instances of these one-lane shifts. The driver could 
also shift two lanes to the left or right, where this could 
again involve entering or exiting the highway. As a final 
option, the driver may choose a passing maneuver, which 
we view as two successive lane shifts of opposite direction. 
In Figure 2, the variable gen maneuver represents the gen­
eral driving maneuver and takes on a value corresponding 
to the chosen plan. 
We can also classify driving plans according to the acceler­
ation. Depending on the current and desired speed, a driver 
may decide to speed up, slow down, or maintain current 
speed, indicated by the value of the variable ace maneuver 
of Figure 2. The acceleration maneuver depends on the lane 
maneuver if we do not consider the plan selection mecha­
nism. For instance, a deceleration is more likely as a part 
of a right lane change plan than as a part of a plan to pass. 
However, the two variables are independent given the ini­
tial context, as indicated in the network. 
The variable spec pass in Figure 2 indicates the direction 
of the pass, if one is taking place. Since passing in a spe­
cific direction is a subplan of the general passing maneuver 
which gen maneuver can represent, this is an example of 
the subsumption relation found in event hierarchies. If the 
driver decides to pass, there are the options of passing on the 
left and passing on the right. And even if the driver chooses 
to pass, there may be cars blocking both lanes, forcing the 
driver to wait for another opportunity to pass. This variable 
clearly depends on gen maneuver, since the more general 
passing maneuver is its parent and the conditional proba­
bility table represents a subsumption relation as described 
above. In other words, if a passing maneuver is not cho­
sen, then spec pass will be neither pass on left nor pass on 
right. 
3.3.2 Plan Selection 
Links from the agent's mental state into the plan subnet­
work represent the agent's planning process. For hierarchi­
cal planning, we start with the most general plan nodes and 
proceeding to the most specific, determine which aspects of 
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the mental state influence the agent's choice. For instance, 
suppose the agent's decision-making procedure consists of 
a set of condition-action rules. Then, any plan choices in 
the action portion of a rule depend on all of the context 
variables that appear in the conditions of the rule. By con­
necting only parts of the mental state relevant to particular 
choices, we keep the dependency structure as simple as pos­
sible. 
We must then specify the conditional probabilities of the 
plan variables given the relevant aspects of the agent's men­
tal state. If the agent is a deterministic planner, then the con­
ditional probability given a particular mental state instanti­
ation will be 1 for a single instantiation of the plan subnet­
work and 0 for all others. For nondeterministic planners, we 
must determine the conditional probabilities from whatever 
agent model we have. 
If in fact we have no opportunity to observe anything about 
the initial world state or the agent's mental state, then we 
may collapse the initial state and mental state subnetworks 
into prior probabilities for the top-level plan variables. The 
plan recognition networks (PRNs) of Charniak and Gold­
man ( 1993) use such priors to model the agent's plan selec­
tion process. These prior probabilities represent the same 
distribution as the explicit planning process subnetwork, 
but since the initial nodes are unobservable, we can merge 
the nodes into the plan subnetwork without losing informa­
tion. 
We can now model a driver's plan selection with some re­
liability. In our Bayesian network, the conditional proba­
bility table must specify the likelihood of certain maneu­
vers under every possible combination of world situation 
and driver mental state. Under most situations, there will 
be one maneuver that is clearly preferable, though there is 
still uncertainty. For example, suppose that the driver is cur­
rently traveling below the desired speed and that there is an­
other car directly in front while the lane to the left is clear. 
Then it is likely that driver will pass the car on the left. The 
complete plan selection subnetwork is shown in Figure 2. 
This model of the driver's decision process is based in part 
on the driving model underlying the BATmobile (Bayesian 
Automated Taxi) project, described by Forbes, et al. ( 1995). 
The acceleration maneuver depends only on the preferabil­
ity of the current speed. Thus the sole link to ace maneu­
ver is from at target?. If the driver is at the target speed, 
then the current speed will be maintained. If the current 
speed is too low, then the driver will choose an acceleration 
maneuver. Likewise, if the current speed is too fast, then a 
deceleration maneuver will be chosen. 
The lane change maneuver also depends on the preferability 
of the current speed. For instance, a car traveling at its target 
speed is unlikely to change lanes. However, there are other 
factors in the initial world state to consider. Obviously, the 
current lane is important, since a car in the leftmost lane 
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cannot change lanes to the left. In addition, the driver will 
consider any cars to the front or back. If there is a car block­
ing the front and the driver's current speed is too low, then a 
simple acceleration could cause a collision. The driver may 
instead choose to change lanes to the left. But a decision to 
change lanes must also consider the presence of cars to the 
driver's left or right, or any cars coming up from the back 
left or right. The links to the gen maneuver node represent 
these dependencies. 
If the driver decides to pass, a direction must be chosen. 
Passing on the left is preferable to passing on the right, but 
the current situation may not allow it. For instance, any cars 
to the driver's left or to the front left could block the passing 
attempt. The same is true on the right side. If enough pass­
ing avenues are blocked, then the driver may decide to delay 
the passing attempt or to perform the initial lane change and 
wait to complete the pass. 
3.3.3 Agent Communication 
Modeling agent communication depends greatly on the spe­
cific protocol adopted, and the relationship between the ob­
server and the observed. If a trusted agent directly an­
nounces particular aspects of its planning process, then we 
could simply instantiate the corresponding variables. Other 
types of communication would require nodes to represent 
beliefs we attribute to the agent, based on its communica­
tion actions. Note that we are not modeling here the planned 
character of communication acts; to do so we would treat 
them as we do actions in general. 
The only communication allowed in our traffic model is 
through the driver's tum indicator, which provides a sim­
ple mechanism for a driver to announce the intended lane 
change. The variables signal mx? in the fourth column of 
Figure 2 represent the state of the driver's tum signal dur­
ing stage x of the maneuver. Clearly, both the general ma­
neuver and the specific direction of any passing attempt in­
fluence any signal. For instance, when performing a left 
lane change, signal mO? is likely to take the value Left 
and signal m1? the value Off. Of course, many drivers 
fail to signal their maneuvers, and sometimes they signal 
erroneously. These possibilities are considered when deter­
mining the conditional probability tables. However, drivers 
are usually consistent in their signaling habits. For instance, 
when performing a pass on the left, someone who fails to 
signal the initial left lane change is unlikely to signal the 
subsequent right change. The link between the two signal 
variables represents this consistency. 
3.4 PLAN EXECUTION 
The agent's plan execution process is reflected in the model 
by dependencies from its plan subnetwork to another sub­
network describing its activity. This is analogous to links in 
event hierarchies connecting plans to their component ob-
Figure 3: Plan execution subnetwork 
servable actions. In PRS (Ingrand et al., 1992; Lee et al., 
1994), Knowledge Areas (KAs) specify a sequence of ac­
tions associated with a plan, corresponding to links from the 
plan node to corresponding action nodes. Either of these 
can be cast in Bayesian networks, representing the likeli­
hood of the component's appearance given the plan in the 
conditional probability table for that node. 
All of these methods for modeling the dependency of the 
agent's activity on its plan are acceptable. We require only 
that the agent's activity be conditionally independent of the 
initial world state and the agent's mental state given the 
plan. That is, we assume that the plan is a sufficient speci­
fication of activity. 
The activity subnetwork in the traffic model includes the in­
dividual transitions in lane and speed, which are completely 
unobservable. At each step, the driver can change one lane 
to the left or right, or remain in the same lane. The driver 
can also increase, decrease, or maintain speed. All of the 
plans we consider produce a two-step action sequence. For 
instance, a plan to shift one lane to the left produces a left 
lane change followed by a "remain in lane" act. The lat act 
mx variables in Figure 3 represent the lane changes at step 
x, while fwd act mx represents the acceleration at step x. 
Our definition of the lane maneuvers completely determines 
the lane changes of the action sequences. The individual 
shifts depend on the general lane maneuver, as well as on 
the specific passing plan, but not on the acceleration maneu­
ver. Likewise, the individual accelerations are independent 
of the general lane changes and the specific passing maneu­
vers if given the overall acceleration plan. 
3.5 WORLD DYNAMICS 
The relationship between the observed and actual actions of 
the agent is similar to that of the observed and actual world 
states. If we have perfect sensors, we do not need a separate 
observed activity subnetwork; otherwise, we have to model 
sensor noise in the links from the actual nodes. 
In some cases, the agent's activity is completely inaccessi-
ble, though we might still be able to observe effects of this 
activity. These effects are dictated by the dynamics of our 
world, which specify how the agent's actions alter the sit­
uation. Therefore, we must model how subsequent world 
states depend on the initial world state and the agent's ac­
tivity. It is possible that a world state depends on the entire 
world history, but if the the plan is sufficiently structured 
(e.g., sequential actions) then we may be able to simplify 
this dependency. If we express the effects model in accord 
with standard AI approaches, we can restrict the effects to 
depend only on background and direct effects and, given 
these, to be conditionally independent of the plan itself, as 
well as further removed activity and indirect effects (Well­
man, 1990). 
We can make effects conditionally independent of future ac­
tions and effects simply by ensuring that links never point 
backward in time, but this could make actions dependent 
on past world states. So far, we have had links move from 
plans to activity and from activity to effects, so adding links 
in the opposite direction would go against the flow in Fig­
ure 1. If, as described above, the plan is sufficient for deter­
mining activity, the current action is conditionally indepen­
dent of the previous world states given the current plan, as 
well as the actions performed so far. 
Depending on our domain, we may able to make a Markov 
assumption with respect to activity and the effects. In such 
cases, the current action would be conditionally indepen­
dent of actions more than one time step back in the action 
sequence, given the current plan and the action immediately 
previous. If the effects have a similar property, they should 
not depend on any world states or actions more than one 
step previous. Although this would greatly localize the de­
pendencies, this may not always be possible, depending on 
the types of observations available and the set of state vari­
ables in the model. 
Since there is no directly observable activity in the traffic 
model, most of our inference will come from observed ef­
fects. We must now model the dynamics of the traffic world, 
beginning with the changes in the position and speed of the 
car. We can view the actions of the driver to be transitions 
between world states. To simplify the model, we ignore ob­
servations taking place while the driver is performing an ac­
tion. Thus, evidence is available only at the completion of a 
component action, and there are three stages of observable 
variables, including the context, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
Finally, we must define the dependencies of these effects. 
Most of the observable variables depend on the driver's pre­
vious action, as well as their own previous values. For 
instance, the driver's lane is completely determined if we 
know what lane change just took place, as well as the lane 
value just before the change. Likewise, the driver's speed 
depends on the previous speed and whatever acceleration 
action took place, although this is clearly not a determinis-
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Figure 4: Observation subnetwork 
tic relationship. 
The presence of other cars is a bit more complex, due to 
the driver's movements. For instance, after a left change, 
a car that was to the front and left is now probably directly 
in front. But if the driver stays in the same lane, then we 
must check whether there was a car blocking the front in 
the previous world state. Therefore, each clearance vari­
able depends on the previous action, as well as all relevant 
clearance variables from the previous state. To simplify the 
network, we ignore the presence of other cars in the evi­
dence. We do consider them when modeling plan selection, 
but since the driver's actions do not directly affect the other 
drivers' positions, we ignore these effects. As with the con­
text, we assume perfect sensors, so there is no distinction 
between the actual and observed effects. 
3.6 PLAN RECOGNITION 
Once we have created the belief network, we can per­
form recognition tasks by fixing any observed variables and 
querying the network about the relevant variables. We re­
ceive evidence only about the variables in the bottom half 
of Figure I, though, as described before, these may corre­
spond exactly to actual variables in the planning model. 
Once we fix the values of the known variables in the net­
work, we can propagate the information throughout the net­
work and observe the posterior probabilities at the nodes of 
interest. For instance, we may be interested in determining 
the plan chosen by the agent, in which case we would ex­
amine the nodes in the plan subnetwork. Alternatively, we 
can predict future agent activity or effects by examining the 
probabilities Of those variables. 
Once we have constructed the entire traffic maneuver net­
work, shown in Figure 5, we can handle plan recognition in 
a wide range of useful driving situations. For instance, sup­
pose we are trying to predict the behavior of the car behind 
us as we are driving in the middle lane of a three-lane high­
way. We observe the car move into the rightmost lane, and 
we want to determine if it is passing us, or preparing to exit, 
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Figure 5: Complete Bayesian network for traffic monitoring 
or perhaps simply moving into the slower-moving lane. 
Thus, in the context, we have observed front clr? tO to be 
false and x position tO to be the middle lane. The only ob­
served effect is that x position t1 is the right lane. If we 
want to infer the driver's plan, we can examine the gen ma­
neuver? node to see that the posterior probability of a one­
lane right shift is 0.64, while that of a pass is 0.35. The for­
mer is more plausible since we assume that drivers prefer to 
pass on the left-hand side, so passing on the right has a rela­
tively low prior probability. The only remaining maneuver 
with nonzero probability is an exit. All of the other plans 
have zero probability, since the observed change in lanes vi­
olates their definitions. 
If we are not interested in the driver's plan, but only in the 
future lane position, then we can examine the x position t2 
node. The posterior probability that the car will still be in 
the right lane is 0.65, while the probability that it will move 
to the middle lane is 0.34. The difference between these be­
liefs and that of the maneuvers arises from the nature of the 
passing maneuver. Even if the car decides to pass, it may 
not be able to do so immediately do to surrounding cars. In 
such a case, it will remain in its current lane until it can com­
plete the maneuver. Thus, there is a slight probability that 
the car will stay in the right lane even if the driver has de­
cided to pass. 
Given no other contextual observations, it is reasonable to 
predict that the car will remain in the right lane. However, if 
we also observed that there was another car to our left, thus 
blocking the car behind us from passing on the left, we can 
instantiate the frontL clr? tO variable to be false. Repeat­
ing our observation of the nodes of interest, we find that the 
posterior probability that the car is passing has increased to 
0.53, while that for the car simply shifting one lane to the 
right has dropped to 0.46. The probabilities for x position 
t2 have changed as well, to 0.51 and 0.48 respectively. If we 
made our final decisions based simply on maximum proba­
bilities, we would predict that the car was passing us. No­
tice that, without knowing about the car to our left, our pre­
diction would be that the car was not passing, but the obser­
vation of that aspect of the context changes our belief. 
Thus, we are able to perform valuable inference with only 
a limited subset of the possible observations. If we were to 
also observe that there were no other cars nearby, other than 
those already considered, then we could instantiate the re­
maining clearance context variables to be true. Doing so in­
creases the posterior probability that the maneuver is a pass 
to 0.6 1, while decreasing that for a one-lane right shift to 
0.39. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The traffic application presented above illustrates several 
aspects of our plan-recognition framework, highlighting the 
importance of accounting for context. Our assumption of 
rationality on the part of the agent allowed us to model the 
relationship between an agent's plan and its mental state. 
By modeling a driver's decision process, observations of 
the initial state provided strong evidence about the result­
ing plan. We were also able to model plan execution in a 
manner similar to other approaches to recognition. The re­
sulting network was able to perform useful inference, even 
when given only partial observations. 
Although the traffic example is a very specific domain, we 
believe that the general structure of Figure 1 is applicable 
to a broad class of plan-recognition tasks. Even with our 
restrictive assumptions, the network captures an extensive 
model of planning behavior. The driver observes the world, 
generates a plan, performs a sequence of actions, and these 
actions produce changes in the world state. To summarize, 
we have augmented the common plan execution model em­
ployed in recognition to include plan formulation, and the 
result is encouraging. 
However, the generality and scalability of our framework 
remains to be seen. The driver we considered had two goals, 
an intended exit and a target driving speed. Other drivers, 
and agents in other domains, will most likely have more 
complex preferences and a more complex decision process. 
The decision process may involve a more elaborate plan­
ning theory, which may be difficult to capture in our model. 
In addition, the major issue of communication is as yet un­
explored within our model. In future work, we intend to 
push on these issues, by increasing the scale and complexity 
of the underlying process we are modeling. 
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